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ABSTRACT 
There is currently a conflict between laws and the market in 
their treatment of email. Laws mandate that emails are not 
protected as property unless copyrightable or protected by 
another legal mechanism. But the market suggests that emails are 
user-owned property without further qualification. Moreover, the 
nature of email is treated slightly differently between the U.S. and 
U.K. legal regimes. While the current legal regimes applicable to 
email in the U.K. and U.S. are reasonable, legal harmonization 
within these systems, and with the service provider market, should 
be achieved.  
INTRODUCTION 
 Email is widely known as an electronic system for exchange of 
messages over the Internet. However, “email” commonly refers to 
individual electronic messages, and usually only to the text of the 
messages and their attachments.1 Email “accounts,” on the other hand, can 
be analogized to the paper on which letters are written.2 Along this line, 
accounts may be explained as some form of “physical” representation of 
email, enabling and regulating access to the content, just as papers are 
physical representation of letters and define access to their content.  
 According to the terms of service of Google, the leading email 
service provider, the content that users “upload, submit, store, send or 
receive” is owned by the users.3 Most service providers, however, claim a 
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1 See DEREK HANSEN ET.AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS WITH 
NODEXL: INSIGHTS FROM A CONNECTED WORLD 106 (2010); Jianqiang Shen et 
al., A Comparison Study of User Behavior on Facebook and Gmail, 29 
COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 2650, 2650–55 (2013). 
2 Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1651 (2012) 
(referring to Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480 (1867)). 
3 Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://www.google.com/intl/en-GB/policies/terms/. See also Yahoo Terms of 
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worldwide, royalty free and non-exclusive license to use and perform other 
actions with that content.4 There are some minor differences, however. 
When it comes to ownership, Google refers to all user content whereas 
Microsoft refers only to some user content.5 As for terms of service, 
Google’s and Microsoft’s terms apply to all content, whereas Yahoo’s 
terms apply only to “photos, graphics, audio or video.”6 For all other 
content that users “submit or make available for inclusion on publicly 
accessible areas of the Yahoo Services,”7 Yahoo retains “[a] worldwide, 
royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, and fully sub-
licensable license.”8 Emails do not seem to belong to any of those 
categories. Thus, the general provision allowing users to retain ownership 
appears to apply to email content.  
 But does U.S. and U.K. law agree that users own this email 
content as property? To answer this question, this note will focus on the 
legal nature of emails and accounts, represented by their content.9 First, it 
will focus on the state of the law with respect to copyright issues, which 
spans users’ rights to control the original content of emails they create. 
Then, it will focus on the state of the law with respect to users owning 
information, personal data, and related data contained in their emails as 
                                                     
Service, YAHOO! (Jan. 20, 2014), https://info.yahoo.com/legal/eu/yahoo/utos/en-
gb/. 
4 Id. 
5 Microsoft Services Agreement, MICROSOFT (June 4, 2015), 
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows-live/microsoft-services-
agreement (“[Y]our communications with others; postings or feedback submitted 
by you to Microsoft via the Services; and the files, photos, documents, audio, 
digital works, and videos that you upload, store or share through the Services.”).  
6 Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO! ¶ 9.2 (Jan. 20, 2014), 
https://info.yahoo.com/legal/eu/yahoo/utos/en-gb/.  
7 Id. ¶ 9.4  
8 Id. 
9 Edwards and Harbinja define digital assets “widely and not exclusively to 
include a huge range of intangible information goods associated with the online 
or digital world”, giving examples of different digital assets. Lillian Edwards & 
Edina Harbinja, What Happens to My Facebook Profile When I Die? Legal Issues 
Around Transmission of Digital Assets on Death, in DIGITAL LEGACY AND 
INTERACTION: POST-MORTEM ISSUES 115, 115–44 (Cristiano Maciel & Vinicius 
Carvalho Pereira eds., 2013). For other definitions see Naomi Cahn, Postmortem 
Life On-Line, 25 PROB. & PROP. 36, 36–37 (2011); Jamie Hopkins, Afterlife in the 
Cloud: Managing a Digital Estate, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH L.J. 210, 211(2013); 
Delia Băbeanu et al., Strategic Outlines: Between Value and Digital Assets 
Management, 11 ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS APULENSIS SERIES OECONOMICA 318, 
319 (2009). 
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property.10 The analysis will be based on U.K.—mainly English—and 
U.S. law. Finally, this note will evaluate western property theories and 
determine whether they are applicable to email information.    
 I. CASE LAW: A BACKGROUND   
 The U.S. and the European media widely reported the U.S. case 
of In Re Ellsworth as a clarification on the nature of email.11 The case, 
however, did not clarify the issue of the nature of email at all. It perhaps 
even complicated the matter further. In the case, Yahoo, an email provider, 
initially refused to give the family of a U.S. Marine Justin Ellsworth, who 
was killed in action in Iraq, access to his email account. Yahoo referred to 
their terms of service, which were designed to protect the privacy of the 
user by forbidding access to third parties upon death of the user.12 Yahoo 
also argued that the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
prohibited them from disclosing a user’s personal communications 
without a court order.13 The family argued that as his heirs, they should be 
able to access the entire account, including his sent and received emails, 
as his last words. Yahoo, on the other hand, had a non-survivorship policy. 
What is more, Ellsworth’s account could have been deleted, contrary to 
the wishes of his family. The judge in this case allowed Yahoo to enforce 
their privacy policy and did not order transfer of the account username and 
                                                     
10 See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 art. 
2(a).  
11 In re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. 2005). See also, e.g., 
Who Owns Your E-mails?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2005),  http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4164669.stm; Paul Sancya, Yahoo Will Give 
Family Slain Marine's E-Mail Account, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2005), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-04-21-marine-e-
mail_x.htm?POE=TECISVA; Tress Baldas, Slain Soldier’s E-Mail Spurs Legal 
Debate: Ownership of Deceased’s Messages at Crux of Issue, 27 NAT’L L.J. 10 
(2005). 
12 Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO! (Jan. 20, 2014), 
https://policies.yahoo.com/ie/en/yahoo/terms/utos/index.htm (“No Right of 
Survivorship and Non-Transferability. Your Yahoo account is non-transferable 
and any rights to your Yahoo ID or contents within your account will be cancelled 
upon your death. If we receive a copy of a death certificate, the relevant account 
may be cancelled and all its contents permanently deleted.”). 
13 See Ada Kulesza, What Happens to Your Facebook Account When You Die?, 
LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 3, 2012), http://blogs.lawyers.com/2012/02/what-happens-
to-facebook-account-when-you-die/; Justin Atwater, Who Owns Email? Do You 
Have the Right to Decide the Disposition of Your Private Digital Life?, 2006 
UTAH L. REV. 397, 401 (2006). 
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password. Rather, he ordered Yahoo to provide the family with a CD 
containing copies of the emails in the account.14  
 What legal regime could explain this result? One interpretation is 
that Yahoo owned the copies of the emails stored on their servers, but were 
required by the court order to make the information in them available.15 
For this justification can be found in the traditional division of rights in 
letters. Yahoo would own the emails—as a physical representation—but 
the deceased, as author, would own the copyright, transferred 
subsequently to the heirs. A second interpretation is to regard the deceased 
as the owner of the emails while alive, which then could be transmitted to 
the heirs of the deceased upon death.16 This interpretation is less likely, as 
the court would then have regarded the rights of the heirs as overriding the 
terms and conditions entered into by the deceased, ordering full access to 
the account. The court only ordered Yahoo to disclose the contents of the 
emails, though. Thus, it can be concluded that Yahoo was found to have 
ownership of the account, and the heirs’ were found to have a right to 
access the content of the emails. But the court refrained from establishing 
principles in relation to property, intellectual or otherwise, in email 
content. Instead, it focused on privacy issues.17 Alas, the case left many 
questions open and provided little guidance that could be applied 
subsequently. 
 English law has been slightly more specific on the issue. In 
Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins, Justice Edwards-Stuart 
concluded that emails could not be considered property.18 The case 
concerned a commercial dispute between an ex-employee and the new 
owners of a company. The dispute involved important emails sent to the 
ex-employee, which had been forwarded to his private email address and 
deleted from the company server. The company claimed that the emails 
should be declared the property of the company.  Referring to previous 
case law relating to the status of information as property in the context of 
letters,19 Justice Edwards-Stuart identified a distinction between a physical 
                                                     
14 See Soldier's Kin to Get Access to His Emails, JUSTINELLSWORTH.NET (Apr. 
21, 2005), http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/ap-apr05.htm.   
15 Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 9, at 123–25. 
16 See id. at 123–24. 
17 See generally Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent’s 
E-Mails: Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 313-314 (2007); Atwater, supra note 12, at 399. 
18 Fairstar Heavy Transport NV v. Adkins, [2012] EWHC (TCC) 2952 [58] (Eng). 
See also Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 9, at 120. 
19 See, e.g., Philip v. Pennell [1907] 2 Ch 577 (Eng.); Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 
2 AC 46 (Eng.); Coogan v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 
48 (Eng.); Force India Formula One Team v. 1 Malaysian Racing Team [2012] 
EWHC (Ch) 616 (Eng.). 
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medium and the information it carried, noting that only a physical object—
paper—can be owned.20 The judge concluded that “[t]here are no 
compelling practical reasons that support the existence of a proprietary 
right—indeed, practical considerations militate against it.”21  
 Subsequently, the Court of Appeal recognized the difficulties that 
property in information encounters conceptually. The court, however, 
wisely avoided this discussion and decided that the real issue in the case 
was that of agency. The first instance decision, therefore, provides some 
guidance and an indication that in black-letter English law, emails are not 
considered property. This, at a first glance, makes it clear that we need to 
consider some other legal mechanisms in order to define the nature of 
emails, such as copyright, contracts, or privacy.  
II. COPYRIGHT IN EMAILS 
 Emails are perceived mainly as works22 created by their authors, 
the email senders. Therefore, copyright appears to be one of the most 
                                                     
20  Fairstar EWHC (TCC) 2952 [43] (“I disagree; there is or may be an important 
distinction between the physical object which carries the information - for 
example, a letter - and the information which that object conveys. A letter, which 
consists of paper together with the ink of the writing which is on it, is clearly a 
physical object that can be owned. However, it does not follow from this that the 
information which the letter conveys is also property that is capable of being the 
subject of a proprietary claim (for this purpose I leave aside the possibility of any 
claim arising out of copyright in respect of the contents of the letter).”; id. ¶ 58 
(“In my judgment it is clear that the preponderance of authority points strongly 
against there being any proprietary right in the content of information, and this 
must apply to the content of an e-mail, although I would not go so far as to say 
that this is now settled law. Some of the observations that I have quoted are in 
terms that are less than emphatic and, of course, the two contrary views in 
Boardman v Phipps are entitled to significant weight.”). See also Boardman 2 AC 
46 [127]; Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. [2008] 1 AC 1 [275] (Eng.) (“That observation 
still holds good in that information, even if it is confidential, cannot properly be 
regarded as a form of property.”); Force India EWHC (Ch) 616 [376].  
21 Fairstar EWHC (TCC) 2952 [69]. Justice Edwards-Stuart’s analysis illustrates 
five different scenarios that would be the potential results if an email was 
considered capable of being property. These scenarios will be discussed more in 
section II.B.1.ii. 
22 This note focuses on the unpublished content of emails, either in the form of an 
attachment or as the text of the message, rather than content of emails that has 
been published elsewhere. Although not published elsewhere, this note argues 
these previously unpublished works should nevertheless be protected by 
copyright as literary or musical works. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 
1988, c. 48, § 3 (U.K.); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Additionally, the definition of 
“published” encompasses Internet publications. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 175 (U.K.); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 3, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 
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obvious answers when determining the legal nature of emails. Historically, 
copyright protection of unpublished works was perpetual in the common 
law jurisdictions, the United Kingdom and United States.23 This has been 
changed, however, and the duration has been harmonized at the EU level, 
as well as with U.S. law.24 Currently, copyright in the European Union, 
United Kingdom and the United States subsists in unpublished works for 
the duration equal to that of copyright in published works—seventy years 
after the author’s death.25  Additionally, an important change in the 
European Union resulted in incentivizing the publication of unpublished 
works. The Copyright Term Directive, and consequently the U.K. law,26 
awarded a person an additional twenty-five years of copyright protection 
for the first lawful publication of a work previously unpublished.27 
 Emails and attachments unpublished elsewhere, therefore, could 
potentially qualify for the copyright protection as literary works.28 
However, publishing to a limited number of people is not making the 
content available to the public, and therefore emails would generally not 
meet the requirement of publication in the United Kingdom and the United 
States.29 The content could, however, still by copyrighted by meeting the 
general requirements of originality and fixation, or recording. 
                                                     
1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. See also Damien McCallig, Private but Eventually 
Public: Why Copyright in Unpublished Works Matters in the Digital Age, 10 
SCRIPTED 39, 43–44 (2013); Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 9, at 116. 
23 Copyright protection of unpublished works was perpetual in the United 
Kingdom until the adoption of The Duration of Copyright and Rights in 
Performances Regulations 1995, SI 1995/3297, and in the United States until the 
adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012), when 
unpublished works were brought under the federal jurisdiction. See also Elizabeth 
Townsend Gard, January 1, 2003: The Birth of the Unpublished Public Domain 
and its International Consequences, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 697–706 
(2006). 
24 See Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term 
of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9; 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, §§ 302-303 (2012). 
25 Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related 
Rights, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12, 13. 
26 The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996, SI 1996/2967, art. 16 
(UK).  
27 Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related 
Rights, art. 4, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12, 14. 
28 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 1, § 3(1) (U.K.). 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2010). 
29 See Getaped.com, Inc. v.  Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(publishing on the website, available to all, constituted publication for the purpose 
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 Fixation or recording would not create a significant obstacle, as 
electronic fixation has been recognized as meeting the requirements.30 The 
U.S. law mandates that a work is only fixed “when its embodiment in a 
copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”31 The focus of this definition is on the notion of “a 
period of more than transitory duration.” This has been interpreted by the 
U.S. courts in a number of cases, including MAI Systems v. Peak 
Computers, Inc.32 There, the court confirmed that reproduction in RAM—
Random Access Memory—are fixed copies. This finding is significant as 
RAM copies are not permanent and are only present while a computer is 
turned on.33  
 In the United Kingdom, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
mandates that “Copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic or 
musical work unless and until it is recorded, in writing or otherwise.”34 
Writing is further defined as “any form of notation or code, whether by 
hand or otherwise and regardless of the method by which, or medium in 
or on which, it is recorded.”35 The statutory definition in the United 
Kingdom appears clearer than the definition in the United States, referring 
to any medium, therefore including digital recording as well. Accordingly, 
case law provides that “an artistic work may be fixed in the source code of 
a computer program.”36 Consequently, it is clear that the fixation 
requirement is satisfied in the case of emails. Emails are stored “more than 
transiently” on the service provider’s servers or in the “cloud,” and as such 
are definitely more permanent than RAM. 
 Originality would arguably create a bigger issue, since many 
emails contain mere information, such as facts and personal data, and 
                                                     
of 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). This interpretation would arguably comply with the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c. 48, § 175 (U.K.)).  
30 Berne Convention in art. 2, Sept. 28, 1979, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010), Copyright, 
Designs, and Patent Act, 1988, §§ 3(2), 178 (not requiring fixation, but allowing 
member states to use this requirement in their national law).  
31 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
32 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
33 See also Triad Sys. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Stenograph LLC v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Systems, 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 
1994); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 
2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. 
Supp. 2d 737, 745 (D. Md. 2003); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g 
& Consulting, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12391, 11–12 (D. Mass. 2004). 
34 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 § 3(2) (U.K.). 
35 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 § 178 (U.K.). 
36 SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd. [2013] R.P.C. 17 ¶ 29. 
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probably would not pass the threshold of originality developed by the U.K. 
and U.S. courts—no matter how low the threshold is.37 If we look at the 
cases involving copyright in letters, it is clear that business 
correspondence,38 a solicitor’s letter to his client,39 and personal letters40 
pass this threshold. This can mean that emails that consist of personal or 
professional correspondence and are of some length—even a few 
sentences—could satisfy the requirement of originality.  
 Emails consisting of a single word, phrase, or sentence would 
have more difficulty, however. Generally, U.K. and EU laws could 
potentially protect these emails by copyright, but U.S. laws definitely 
would not. In the U.K., for instance, the book title “Splendid Misery” was 
denied copyright in Dick v. Yates,41 as was “the Lawyer's Diary” in Rose 
                                                     
37 For the US see Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 
(1884); Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (“As 
a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a 
work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity. Rural's white 
pages, limited to basic subscriber information and arranged alphabetically, fall 
short of the mark.”). For the most important UK cases see Walter v. Lane [1900] 
A.C. 539, 548; Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd., [1916] 
2 Ch. 601, 608; Interlego AG v. Tyco Indus. Inc. [1989] A.C. 217, 29 (P.C.); 
Express Newspapers Plc v. News (U.K.) Ltd. [1991] F.S.R. 36, 43 (Ch. D.); 
Newspaper Licensing Agency, Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer, Plc, [2001] UKHL 38, 
[2002] R.P.C. 4 (appeal taken from Eng.). See also, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, Feist 
Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright 
Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 949–82 (2002); Pamela Samuelson, 
Originality Standard for Literary Works under U.S. Copyright Law, 42 AM. J. 
COMP. L. SUPP. 393, 393–418 (1994); Andreas Rahmatian, Originality in UK 
 Copyright Law: The Old “Skill and Labor” Doctrine Under Pressure, 44(1) INST. 
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 4 (2013); Agustin Waisman, Revisiting 
Originality, 31(7) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 370 (2009). 
38 Cembrit Blunn Ltd, Dansk Eternit Holding A/S v. Apex Roofing Services LLP, 
Roy Alexander Leader [2007] EWHC 111, ¶ 238 (Ch.); Tett Bros. Ltd. v. Drake 
& Gorham Ltd [1928-1935] MacG. Cop. Cas. 492 (Ch.) (copyright in the 
following text (omitting “Dear Sir” and “Yours etc.”) was held to be infringed: 
“Further to the writer's conversation with you of to-day's date, we shall be obliged 
if you will let us have full particulars and characteristics of ‘Chrystalite’ or 
‘Barex.’ Also we shall be obliged if you will let s have your lower prices for 1, 2, 
3, 4 and 5 ton lots and your annual contract rates. We have been using a certain 
type of mineral for some time past and have not found it completely satisfactory, 
and as we shall be placing an order in the very near future we shall be obliged if 
you will let us have this information at your earliest convenience”). 
39 Musical Fid. Ltd. v. Vickers [2002] EWCA Civ 1989; [2003] FSR 50. 
40 Pope v. Curl (1741) 2 Atk. 342; Lord Perceval v. Phipps 2 V. & B. 19; 
Macmillan & Co. v Dent [1907] 1 Ch. 107. 
41 Dick v. Yates, [1881] 18 Ch. D 76. 
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v. Information Services Limited,42 while in other cases, headings were 
given the status of literary work and protected by copyright.43 The 
European Court of Justice has subsequently provided some guidance for 
this issue in the case of Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades 
Forening.44 The court opined that certain sentences or even parts of them 
could be copyrightable, depending on the originality of a respective 
sentence.45 This decision has been followed by the English High Court and 
The Court of Appeal in The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. & Ors v. 
Meltwater Holding BV & Ors.46 The High Court applied the Infopaq test 
and concluded that “[H]eadlines are capable of being literary works.”47 
The judge went even further holding that “it appears that a mere 11 word 
extract may now be sufficient in quantity provided it includes an 
expression of the intellectual creation of the author.”48 The U.S. Copyright 
Office, on the other hand, outright denies registration of copyright in 
names, titles, and short phrases.49 But even in the United Kingdom, single 
words are generally refused copyright protection—for example, 
“Exxon.”50  
                                                     
42 Rose v. Info. Servs. Ltd., [1987] F.S.R. 254 (Ch.). 
43 Shetland Times Ltd. v. Wills, [1997] F.S.R. 604. (S.C.). 
44 Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening (Case C-5/08) [2012] Bus. 
L.R. 102 [2009] E.C.R. 
45 See id. ¶ 47 
[T]he possibility may not be ruled out that certain isolated sentences, or even 
certain parts of sentences in the text in question, may be suitable for conveying to 
the reader the originality of a publication such as a newspaper article, by 
communicating to that reader an element which is, in itself, the expression of the 
intellectual creation of the author of that article. Such sentences or parts of 
sentences are, therefore, liable to come within the scope of the protection provided 
for in article 2(a) of that Directive. 
46 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. & Ors v. Meltwater Holding BV & Ors, 
[2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch.); [2011] EWCA Civ 890. 
47 Id. ¶ 71. 
48 Id. ¶ 77. 
49 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Copyright Protection Not Available for Names, 
Titles, or Short Phrases, CIRCULAR 34 (2012), 
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf; Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 893 
(7th Cir. 1943); Glaser v. St. Elmo Co., 175 F. 276, 278 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); 
Corbett v. Purdy, C.C., 80 F. 901 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1897); Osgood v. Allen, 18 F. 
Cas. 871, 875–76 (C.C.D. Me. 1872) (No. 10,603); Warner Bros. Pictures v. 
Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 311 (2d Cir. 1934); Harper v. Ranous, 67 
F. 904, 905 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895); Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, 8 F. Supp. 
196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). 
50 See Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consultants Int’l Ltd., [1982] Ch. 119 (holding 
the word Exxon does not qualify for copyright protection as an “original literary 
work.”). 
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 Authors of emails could also retain moral rights, on which the 
U.K. and U.S. have similar laws. In the United Kingdom, moral rights 
include: the right to be identified as the author,51 the right to object to 
derogatory treatment of the work,52 and the right against false attribution 
of work.53 The first two rights subsist as long as the copyright lasts—70 
seventy years post-mortem, and the last one lasts until twenty years after 
the author’s death.54 Unless a person waives his moral rights55— the right 
to be identified as the author and the right to object to derogatory treatment 
of the work transmit upon death, passing onto the person as directed by 
will, or a person to whom the copyright passes, or it exercisable by a 
personal representative.56 The right against false attribution is only 
exercisable by a personal representative, pursuant to the same provision of 
the CDPA. The U.S. Copyright Act contains a similar provision as to the 
types of moral rights conferred to the authors. However, these rights expire 
upon the author’s death.57     
 To conclude, despite long emails meeting the requirement of 
originality and fixation, there would be a regulatory vacuum for a 
significant number of short emails. Therefore, copyright is insufficient to 
protect all email communication, necessitating a look at alternative legal 
mechanisms available to protect this content. 
III. PROPERTY IN EMAILS 
 Black-letter law may suggest users may own property in an 
email’s personal data and information.58 Together with a copyright regime, 
this may serve to protect all kinds of email. There may be problems, 
though, with categorizing email as property. 
A. Law on Personal Data as Property 
 Personal data consists of a user’s name, address, date of birth, 
genetic data, religious beliefs, photos, among other things. It is 
                                                     
51 Copyright, Design and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48 § 77 (U.K.). 
52 Id. § 80. 
53 Id. § 84. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. § 87.  
56 Id. § 95.  
57 17 U.S.C. § 106A.  
58 Information encompasses data, ideas, facts, and news, but does not necessarily 
used in the same manner by the information science literature. Nimmer and 
Krauthaus distinguish, amongst other criteria they use, differentiation of 
information by the form of information (summarized data, analyzed data, 
unorganized and organized raw data). See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. 
Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 
55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 110 (Summer 1992).  
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traditionally protected by legal regimes based on protection of privacy, 
undergirded by models based on human rights, torts or contracts. European 
countries mainly perceive privacy and control over personal data as a 
human right—establishing the EU-wide data protection regime, which is 
currently in the process of a comprehensive reform.59 The United States, 
on the other hand, has been using a tort law model.60 The tort model, 
however, has recently penetrated English law in Google Inc v. Vidal-Hall 
& Ors,61 where the Court of Appeal recognized the “tort of misuse of 
private information.” This decision has a potential to revolutionize English 
law on the protection of personal data.  
 Although protected under a tort-privacy right, personal data have 
not traditionally been protected under a property right. The advantage of a 
property regime is that, unlike a tort-privacy regime, there is no need for 
individuals to demonstrate harm in order to be able to protect their 
property—and this holds for both U.S. and U.K. legal regimes.62 But for 
the property rights model to adhere, personal data must compose an asset 
or commodity.63 This has been the subject of extensive debate. 
Nevertheless, proponents argue that a property regime would enable 
individuals to better control the use of personal data and to better share in 
the profits resulting from such use, and would force companies to 
internalize these new costs when deciding to collect or use others’ personal 
data.64 In addition, since property rights are rights in rem and can be 
enforced against anyone, proponents argue that individuals could protect 
                                                     
59 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Dec. 7, 2000. 
See, e.g., Corien Prins, Privacy and Property: European Perspectives and the 
Commodification of our Identity, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 223, 
223–57 (Lucie Guibault & Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).  
60 Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-652E (1977); Andrew J. McClurg, A 
Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer 
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2003). 
61 Google v. Vidal-Hall, 2015 WL 1310650 (2015). 
62 See id. at 247. 
63 See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW 
ASSET CLASS 5, 7, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_Personal 
DataNewAsset_Report_2011.pdf. 
64 Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 
1128 (1999). 
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their data not only against data controllers,65 but against third parties as 
well.66  
 Most of these “propertization” arguments originate in the United 
States, although there are some examples in the European context. For 
example, Prins characterizes the EU regime as utilitarian—as it aims to 
promote the free flow of personal data—and therefore more receptive to a 
property regime than that of the United States.67 Similarly, Purtova argues 
it would enable better control of personal data within the European Union, 
despite differences in property concepts between common and civil law 
countries.68 She argues primarily for introducing the protective features of 
property with respect to third parties, rather than its alienability feature.69 
In an earlier work, this author has argued that due to the introduction of 
the right to be forgotten and data portability rights, the proposed data 
protection regulation is moving towards the propertization of personal 
data.70 
 There are, nevertheless, notable disadvantages of the property 
model. For example, this model may produce monopolization of 
                                                     
65 “Data controllers” is the EU data protection concept, meaning “the natural or 
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly 
with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; 
where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or 
Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his 
nomination may be designated by national or Community law.” See The Data 
Protection Direction 95/46/EC, art. 2 d, 1995 (E.U.) (directive on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data).  
66 See Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical 
Analysis of the 'Right to Be Forgotten' in Big Data Practice, 8 SCRIPTED 256, 
256–58 (2011). Or for the U.S. perspective, see CHRIS CONLEY, THE RIGHT TO 
DELETE (2010), 
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/SSS10/paper/view/1158. 
67 Prins, supra note 59, at 245. 
68See Nadezhda Purtova, Property in Personal Data: Second Life of an Old Idea 
in the Age of Cloud Computing, Chain Informatisation, and Ambient Intelligence, 
in COMPUTERS, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: AN ELEMENT OF CHOICE 61 
(Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2011) (“Property, with some limitations resolved by 
regulation, due to its erga omnes effect and fragmentation of property rights, has 
the potential to reflect and control this complexity of relationships. This may be 
considered an instance of property exercising its protective rather than market 
function; it aims at making sure that even after transfer of a fraction of rights, a 
data subject always retains basic control over his personal information.”). 
69 Id. 
70 Edina Harbinja, Does the EU Data Protection Regime Protect Post-Mortem 
Privacy and What Could Be The Potential Alternatives?, 10 SCRIPTED J. L. Tech. 
& Soc’y 19, 19 (2013). 
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information and prevent freedom of speech.71 Additionally, the property 
model may encourage transactions in personal data, which arguably 
should be discouraged. The principle of alienability would allow the 
purchaser to then sell the data again, attenuating control of the original 
owner.72 This argument, however, presumes the full alienability of 
property. This does not have to be the case.73 Personal data could be 
subject to “hybrid alienability,”74 or a model resembling the limited rights 
granted under copyright law, rather than a “traditional” property right that 
would completely divorce the original owner from all control.75 
 In summary, personal data has never been legally protected as 
property. Instead, protection of personal data has been provided through 
data protection legislation, as torts or by breach of confidence. 
Propertization arguments remained at the theoretical level, without an 
influence to the legislation or case law.76 It puts forth workable ideas, such 
as “hybrid alienability,” but evidence also suggests many problems in 
conceiving personal data as property.  These problems notably include a 
conflict with the human right of privacy. Propertization of personal data, 
therefore, remains a theoretical construct, and a rather unsuccessful one so 
far. 
B. Law on Information as Property 
 Information is not generally regarded as property in black-letter 
law, and especially within the English common law. For instance, in 
                                                     
71 See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
72 Samuelson, supra note 64, at 1136; Jessica Litman, Information 
Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1304 (2000); see also Julie 
E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373,1391 (2000).  
73 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 382–83 (2012); Paul M. Schwartz, 
Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2093 (2004); 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985) (arguing that “alienability is not a binary switch to be 
turned on or off, but rather a dimension of property ownership that can be adjusted 
in many different ways”); Lee Ann Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1403, 1408 (2009).  
74 Schwartz, supra note 73, at 2094–98 (discussing model of property rights in 
personal data, which would “permit the transfer for an initial category of use in 
personal data, but only if the customer is granted an opportunity to block further 
transfer or use by unaffiliated entities”). 
75 See Cohen, supra note 72, at 1428–29. 
76 See id. at 21 (“Post-mortem privacy (deceased persons’ privacy), has been, so 
far, a phenomenon of interest predominantly for sociologists, psychologists, 
anthropologists and other humanities and social sciences scholars. This issues, 
nevertheless, deserves the attention of legal scholarship . . . .”).  
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Boardman v Phipps,77 the court maintained that information is not 
property in any normal sense, but equity will restrain its transmission to 
another if in breach of some confidential relationships.78 There are some 
earlier authorities in English common law conferring proprietary character 
to certain kinds of information. These include Jeffrey v. Rolls Royce Ltd,79 
where Lord Redcliffe was treated as an asset distinct from the physical 
records it was contained80; Herbert Morris Ltd v. Saxelby,81 where trade 
secrets were considered “his master’s property”82; and Dean v. 
MacDowell,83 where information constituted property of the partnership.84 
An infamous case where an English court found property in information 
is Exchange Telegraph Co.  v. Gregory & Co.85 There, the Court of Appeal 
upheld an injunction to restrain the defendant broker from publishing 
information—the quotations in stocks and shares from the Stock 
Exchange—on the grounds that the information was the plaintiff’s 
property.86 However, this stance has not been supported in most of the 
subsequent case law.87 Other rules of law, like contract, tort and breach of 
confidence, are desired instead.88 
 In the United States, authorities asserting information as property 
vary significantly among the individual states, but courts are generally 
more willing to recognize certain kinds of information as property. In U.S. 
International News Service. v. Associated Press,89 the Supreme Court held 
that fresh news could be regarded as quasi-property, provided that 
misappropriation by a competitor constitutes unfair competition.90 Both 
                                                     
77 [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL) (appeal taken from England).  
78 Id. at 128.  
79 [1962] 1 AER 801 (HL) (appeal taken from England). 
80 Id. at 805. 
81 [1916] 1 AC 688 (HL) (appeal taken from England). 
82 Id. at 714. 
83 (1878) 8 Ch D 345 (Eng.). 
84 Id. at 354. 
85 [1896] 1 QB 147. 
86 See id. at 152–53 (Lord Esher M.R.) (“This information . . . is something which 
can be sold. It is property, and being sold to the plaintiffs it was their property. 
The defendant has, with intention, invaded their right of property in it, and he has 
done so surreptitiously and meanly.”). 
87 Paul Kohler & Norman Palmer, Information as Property, in INTERESTS IN 
GOODS 7 (Norman Palmer & Ewan McKendrick eds., 2d ed. 1993). 
88 Id. at 4–5. 
89 248 US 215 (1918). 
90 See id. at 236 (“Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which 
both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, we 
hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be 
regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the 
public.”). There, the Court used a classical Lockean justification for establishing 
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state and federal courts have adopted the doctrine as a general rule of 
unfair competition, thus granting protection to objects outside the reach of 
intellectual property protection. But it has been widely criticized for its 
lack of analysis and superficiality.91 There is a fear this doctrine protects 
objects that intellectual property will not,92 potentially restricting access to 
the public domain and upsetting the balance intellectual property law 
attempts to achieve.93 The doctrine has been a subject of wide controversy 
in American academic writing.94 Nonetheless, lower courts have followed 
the rule of misappropriation set forth in International News Service.95 
 In contrast to the misappropriation theory under U.S. law, England 
established the doctrine of “breach of confidence,” aimed at providing 
protection for valuable information.96 Breach of confidence is an equitable 
doctrine that can be described as similar to the American “trade secret law” 
doctrine.97 In this way, a recent Court of Appeal case decided that 
confidential information should be regarded as a type of intellectual 
                                                     
quasi-property in news, invoking the pains and labor that were taken advantage 
of by the plaintiff’s competitor. The case was a base for developing the doctrine 
of misappropriation in the United States. 
91 Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics 
of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 25 (1991). 
92 Such as fact, for instance. See Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 
250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The general rule of law is, that the noblest 
of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—
become, after voluntary communications to others, free as the air to common 
use.”). 
93 See infra notes 152 to 173 and accompanying text. 
94 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy 
of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 411 
(1983); Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation is Seventy-Five Years Old; Should 
We Bury It or Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 781, 781 (1994); Raymond A. Be, 
Dead or Alive?: The Misappropriation Doctrine Resurrected in Texas, 33 HOUS. 
L. REV. 447, 449 (1996). 
95 Rex Y. Fujichaku, The Misappropriation Doctrine in Cyberspace: Protecting 
the Commercial Value of “Hot News” Information, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 421, 447 
(1998). Most of the cases where courts did recognize a misappropriation action 
involved either appropriation of breaking news or sports performances, likely 
because that information was a source of revenue for media companies. See, e.g., 
Assoc. Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev’d on other grounds, 
299 U.S. 269 (1936); Pottstown Daily News Publ’g Co. v. Pottstown Broad. Co., 
192 A.2d 657 (Pa. 1963); 202 Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. 
Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Twentieth Century Sporting Club v. Transradio Press 
Serv., 300 N.Y.S. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937). 
96 CHARLOTTE WAELDE ET AL, CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW 
AND POLICY 774 (3rd ed. 2013). 
97 Id. at 775–76. 
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property.98 This, however, is an exceptional decision, and it does not 
follow the principles established in the bulk of English case law. Indeed, 
English courts seem to agree that information cannot be considered 
property,99 and arguably, that protection instead lies in tort law. For 
example, in OBG v Allan, the court stated that “[i]nformation, even if it is 
confidential, cannot properly be regarded as a form of property.”100 
Similarly, in Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris, the court, writing about 
breach of confidence, declared that confidence’s “rational basis does not 
lie in proprietary right.” Rather, “it lies in the notion of an obligation of 
conscience arising from the circumstances in or through which the 
information was communicated or obtained.”101  
 As stated before, the doctrine of trade secrets is the American 
counterpart to breach of confidence in England. The Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act broadly defines trade secrets as any information that is secret, 
derives economic value from secrecy, and is the subject of reasonable 
measures to maintain its secrecy.102 Trade secrets can protect many types 
of information,103 and arguably evolved from a property regime in the 
nineteenth century to a combination of contracts, torts and property, and 
eventually to the unfair competition approach adopted by the Restatement 
of Torts in 1939.104 In England that shift never happened, and trade secrets 
remain protected by the breach of confidence doctrine. 
                                                     
98 Coogan v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 48 (Eng.). 
99 See, e.g., M. Conaglen, Thinking about Proprietary Remedies for Breach of 
Confidence, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 82, 84 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing modern view is 
that the foundation of the doctrine of confidence does not rest in the protection of 
property.”); SNELL'S EQUITY, 16-07–16-11 (J.A. McGhee ed., 2004); W. Cornish 
& D. Llewelyn, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE 
MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS, 8-50–54 (2007). 
100 OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL 21 at 275 (Eng.). 
101 Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No.2) [1984] 156 C.L.R. 
414, 438 (Eng.). See also Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 89–90, 102, 127–
28 (Eng.); Breen v. Williams [1996] 186 C.L.R. 71, 81, 91, 111–12, 129; Cadbury 
Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd. [1999] 167 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [48]; Douglas v. 
Hello! Ltd. (No.3) [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595 (Eng.); [2006] Q.B. 125 [119, 126]. 
102 Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 529 § 1(4) (2005). However, U.S. courts 
tend to instead use the negative definition, defining trade secrets “by what [they 
are] not.” D. S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly 
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1107 (2012). 
103 See id. (explaining trade secrets cover items such as chemical formulas, source 
code, methods, prototypes, pre-release pricing, financials, budgets, contract 
terms, business plans, market analyses, salaries, information about suppliers and 
customers, experiments, positive and negative experimental results, engineering 
specifications, laboratory notebooks, and recipes). 
104 Restatement of Torts § 757 (1939). 
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 Trade secret doctrine’s proprietary roots can be seen in certain 
American decisions that describe trade secrets as primarily property.105 
One of the earliest cases deeming trade secrets to be property is Peabody 
v. Norfolk.106 There, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court defined a 
principle applicable to property law in general.107 Regarding trade secrets, 
the court said that the inventor or discoverer of secret information does not 
have exclusive rights against the public or the good faith acquirer, “but he 
has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who 
in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to 
his own use, or to disclose it to third persons.”108 Later, the courts 
continued to connect trade secrets to property. In 1984, The Supreme 
Court held that trade secrets are property for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.109 Additionally, since trade secrets are 
intangible, the Court stated that the existence of a property right depends 
on the extent to which the trade secret is protected from disclosure.110  
 Despite its proprietary origins and select decisions throughout the 
years, U.S. courts have never decided with certainty whether confidential 
information or trade secrets are property. In addition to intellectual 
property, American academia has counted it as part of torts, or something 
that belongs in the criminal law domain.111 Commentators assert trade 
                                                     
105 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. b (1993) 
(describing early trade secret theory as based on property rights); Carpenter v. 
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) ("Confidential business information has 
long been recognized as property."); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, 
Inc., 332 N.W. 2d 890, 897 (Minn. 1983) ("In defining the existence of a trade 
secret as the threshold issue, we first focus upon the "property rights" in the trade 
secret rather than on the existence of a confidential relationship."); IMED Corp. 
v. Sys. Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d (Ala. 1992) ("Our conclusion in this 
regard is consistent with the purpose of the act—to protect individual property 
rights in trade secrets . . . ."). 
106 98 Mass. 452, 457–58 (1868).  
107 See id. at 457 ("If a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his 
skill and attention, the good will of that business is recognized by the law as 
property."). 
108 Id. at 458. 
109 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002–03 (1984) (citing Locke’s 
Second Treatise and other sources to support the finding that trade secrets can be 
property). See also J. W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the 
Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J. L. & TECH. 2 (1999). 
110 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 
U.S. 470, 474–76 (1974) (noting the importance of secrecy to the value of trade 
secrets). 
111 See, e.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 
8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 427, 435–42 (1995); David D. Friedman et al., Some 
Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991); Gale R. Peterson, 
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secret law involves elements of similar areas: property, contract, tort, 
fiduciary duty, and criminal law.112 American trade secret law may after 
all be a fusion of tort and unjust enrichment law.113 Still some believe this 
inquiry is not essential and that what matters is that the information is 
actually protected.114 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that many authors 
still argue that trade secrets are intellectual property rights.115  
 All things considered, U.S. courts and legislators have been more 
willing to recognize information as property. But the property paradigm 
cannot be used for all kinds of information and for all cases because it 
relates to commercially valuable information mainly. Although the 
property paradigm may succeed in the future,116 only tangible objects are 
                                                     
Trade Secrets in an Information Age, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 385 (1995); E. W. Kitch, 
The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
683 (1980); W. B. Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 507, 558 (1939); C. T. Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and 
Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2007); M. Risch, Why Do We Have 
Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2007); V. Chiappetta, Myth, 
Chameleon, or Intellectual Property Olympian?: A Normative Framework 
Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (1999); Hill, supra note 
109; C. Montville, Reforming the Law of Proprietary Information, 56 DUKE L.J. 
1159 (2007); M. P. Simpson, Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism 
– an Age-Old Tale, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1121 (2005); J. Chally, The Law of Trade 
Secrets: Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1269 (2004). 
112 See Hill, supra note 109. 
113 See id. The legislation of trade secrets has been quite a recent phenomenon in 
the US. Before 1980, there was no legislation on this matter. The initial efforts to 
codify and harmonize trade secrets law was that of the Uniform Law Commission, 
which in 1979 adopted the uniform Trade Secrets Act. Following this important 
event, forty-seven states in total enacted civil statutes and over a half of these 
states also have specific criminal provision on trade secrets. In addition, in 1996, 
Congress passed a federal statute criminalizing trade secret misappropriation, 
Economic Espionage Act 18 U.S.C. 55 1831-39. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
14 U.L.A. § 529 (2005); D. S. Almeling et al., A Statisical Analysis of Trade 
Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 67–68 (2011).   
114 See AMEDEE E. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 12 (1962); E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); see also Nature of 
Trade Secrets and Their Protection, 42 HARV. L. REV. 254 (1928) (noting that 
property theories of trade secret protection have limitations and that, in the end, it 
may not matter whether courts regard trade secrets as property, provided they 
protect them). 
115 See Mark A. Lemley & Phillip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules 
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 789 (2007). 
116 Kohler & Palmer, supra note 87, at 206 (noting that the information might be 
deemed to be property in the future, and it would provide the courts with an 
additional instrument). 
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currently protected with certainty,117 leaving the protection of intangible 
information uncertain.118  
C. The Fairstar Case 
 The question of whether new, intangible information such as 
emails should be regarded as property arose in the recent English case, 
Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v Adkins.119 This section will examine the 
scenarios identified by the court in more detail. Justice Edwards-Stuart’s 
analysis of property in emails illustrates five different scenarios: 1) the title 
remains with the creator; 2) the title passes to the recipient (analogous to 
a letter); 3) the recipient had a license to use the content of the email, 4) 
the sender has a license to retain the content and use it, and 5) the title is 
shared between the sender and the recipient, as well as any subsequent 
recipient.120 
 In each of these scenarios, Judge Edwards-Stuart focused on the 
unwanted consequences that would follow if the information in emails 
were to be recognized as property.  Under the first scenario, (the creator 
of the email content retains property in it) he noted that the in rem nature 
of property would entitle the sender to request deletion of the email. The 
judge noted that this “would be very strange—and far reaching.”121   Under 
the second scenario (the recipient has the property right), he pointed out, 
similarly, that the recipient would instead be entitled to request deletion. 
In addition to that “strange outcome”, he noted that further complications 
would arise if the email were forwarded to many recipients, who in turn 
might forward it to even more recipients. There, “the question of who had 
the title in its contents at any one time would become hopelessly 
confused.”122 Under the third and fourth scenarios (recipient and sender, 
respectively, have license to use the content), Justice Edwards-Stuart 
noted that a property concept and a confidentiality concept would be 
redundant. Namely, if information was confidential then property offers 
no extra protections, and if the information was not confidential then there 
would be almost no need to use property’s protections. He concluded that 
a change to a property regime was not necessary in light of these options, 
stating that “there is no compelling need or logic for adopting either of 
                                                     
117 See Thurston v. Charles [1905] 21 T.L.R. 659; British Steel Corp. v. Granada 
Television Ltd. [1981] A.C. 1096, 1105 per Megarry V.C. (Eng.); Kohler & 
Palmer, supra note 87, at 188. 
118 See Kohler & Palmer, supra note 87, at 188. 
119 Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins, [2012] EWHC (TCC) 2952, [64] 
(Eng.). 
120 Id. at 61. 
121 Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins, [2012] EWHC (TCC) 2952, [64] 
(Eng.). 
122 Id. ¶ 66. 
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options (3) or (4) and so in relation to these options I would reject a plea 
that the law is out of line with the state of technology in the 21st century.”123 
 Under the fifth scenario (shared proprietary interests in email 
contents), Justice Edwards-Stuart discussed several possible consequences 
of the loss of information in emails due to technology issues. He argued 
that, in such cases, the affected party could not gain access to the servers 
of the parties with whom he shared property in emails. He concluded that 
“the ramifications would be considerable and, I would have thought, by 
no means beneficial.”124 Accordingly, he concluded that emails are not to 
be considered property.125 
 Subsequently, the Court of Appeal recognized the same 
conceptual difficulties.126 However, the Court further asserted that this 
does not mean that there can never be property in any kind of information, 
as the inquiry depends on the quality of the information in question.127 This 
would mean that information such as “know-how” might be susceptible to 
property, as opposed to personal data.128 Accordingly, the Court wisely 
avoided this discussion and decided that the real issue in the case was that 
of agency, stating an agent must allow the principal access to information 
sent on its behalf.129 In another, even more recent case, the Court of Appeal 
confirmed this long-standing position and, in relation to the customer data 
contained within a database, maintained that information is not regarded 
                                                     
123 Id. ¶ 67. 
124 Id. ¶ 68. 
125 Id. ¶ 69. 
126 “The claim to property in intangible information presents obvious definitional 
difficulties, having regard to the criteria of certainty, exclusivity, control and 
assignability that normally characterize property rights and distinguish them from 
personal rights.” Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins [2013] EWCA (Civ) 
886, [47]. 
127 Id. ¶ 48. 
128 Id. 
129 “In my view, it is unfortunate that the agreed wording of the preliminary issue 
introduced an unnecessary complication into the dispute. The reference to a 
‘proprietary right’ was a distraction from the centrality of the agency relationship 
and its legal incidents. No competing claims of third parties are involved. 
Fairstar's claim is against Mr Adkins. The assertion of a right to inspect and copy 
the content of the emails on his computer relating to its business affairs arises 
from the legal incidents of an agency relationship that survive its termination. That 
question can be decided, as between those parties, without a jurisprudential debate 
about the legal characteristics of ‘property,’ or whether the content of the emails 
was ‘information’ in which property existed in this case or could exist at all.” Id. 
¶ 46. 
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as property in English law.130 Conversely, the medium carrying 
information is an object of property.131  
 In conclusion, it can be generally argues that the U.K. courts do 
not consider information property, whereas U.S. law has done so more 
readily. 
IV. THEORIES OF PROPERTY APPLIED TO INFORMATION 
  In this section, different theories are put forth to determine 
whether one may undergird a property conception of information in 
emails. None, however, are sufficient to accomplish this. 
A. Property as a “Bundle of Sticks” 
 The particular framework used to examine these stances is the 
most widely accepted conception of property in common law systems: the 
“bundle of sticks” theory. In the information context, this theory 
encompasses the following ‘sticks’: the control of copying, access, 
modification, use, and disclosure of data and information.132 
 Providing for all of the sticks in the bundle of information context 
is usually a complex task, if possible at all, due to the characteristics that 
differentiate information from traditional, tangible property. For example, 
information is non-rivalrous,133 as possession can be concurrent and 
                                                     
130 “An electronic database consists of structured information. Although 
information may give rise to intellectual property rights, such as database right 
and copyright, the law has been reluctant to treat information itself as property. 
When information is created and recorded there are sharp distinctions between the 
information itself, the physical medium on which the information is recorded and 
the rights to which the information gives rise. Whilst the physical medium and the 
rights are treated as property, the information itself has never been. As to this, see 
most recently per Lord Walker in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 
A.C. 1 at [275], where he is dealing with the appeal in Douglas v Hello, and the 
discussion of this topic in Green & Randall, The Tort of Conversion at pages 141-
144." Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Bus. Media Ltd. [2014] EWCA (Civ) 281 
[42] (Lord Justice Floyd) (appeal taken from Brighton Cty. Ct.) (Eng.). 
131 “When information is created and recorded there are sharp distinctions 
between the information itself, the physical medium on which the information is 
recorded and the rights to which the information gives rise. Whilst the physical 
medium and the rights are treated as property, the information itself has never 
been.” Id. 
132 See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 58, at 113.  
133 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of 
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (2003); R. Grant 
Hammond, Quantum Physics, Econometric Models and Property Rights to 
Information, 27 MCGILL L.J. 47, 54 (1981); Mark A. Lemley, Property, 
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1059–60 (2005). 
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cannot be transferred as in the case of tangible property;134 information is 
often non-separable, acting as a part of an individual right holder;135 
copying information is easy and not very costly;136 information is often 
time-limited, erasable, and more fluid;137 information is not easily 
excludable, requiring legal measures to mandate its excludability;138 
information generally does not depreciate with use and sometimes even 
gains additional value with use;139 and information is not scarce.140 
 These differences make it difficult to apply the traditional property 
“sticks” (such as use, control, exclusion, possession, destruction) to 
information. On this basis, courts frequently deny information a status of 
property. Nevertheless, major western theories can still be evaluated in 
their ability to establish property rights in information.141 
B. Labor Theory 
 This section evaluates labor theory as a justification of the 
propertization of information, as it is widely used.142 According to Locke, 
                                                     
134 Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 58, at 105. 
135 “Separability” or “thinghood”, means that the things, in order to be property, 
must not be conceived as “an aspect of ourselves or our ongoing personality-rich 
relationships to others.” J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 126 (1997). 
136 See Hammond, supra note 133, at 54. Usually, with the exception of highly 
confidential and protected information, where it could be considerably harder and 
costlier. 
137 Persistence is another quality of property objects, both tangible and intangible. 
It does not mean permanence; it only implies a certain degree of stability. See 
Theodore J. Westbrook, Owned: Finding a Place for Virtual World Property 
Rights, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 782–83 (2006). 
138 For more on excludability, see Boyle, supra note 133, at 42. For Hammond, 
public goods are separated from private goods by a principle of exclusion and for 
information to have this feature, a considerable cost would need to occur. 
Hammond, supra note 133, at 54. 
139 See Boyle, supra note 133, at 44. 
140 See Hammond, supra note 133, at 53. 
141 This discussion will borrow from the normative justifications for the 
recognition of intellectual property. The reason for this is that the same major 
property theories have been used to justify both intellectual property rights and 
propertization. In addition to the same rationale, intellectual property variants of 
these theories are even more suitable in the information context, given that 
intellectual property resources share many of the same features as information, as 
they too are intangible, non-rivalrous, and non-permanent. 
142 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287 
(1989); William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 296–329 (Stephen R. Munzer 
ed., 2007); Seana V. Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual 
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 
138, 138–39 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2007). 
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a creator owns his person and his labor. Because inventions and 
intellectual creations are products of labor, the creator owns them 
according to this theory. But when applying this to information generally, 
one encounters problems.  
 First, information such as facts, news, or things not qualifying as 
intellectual property may not entail labor. With information, there is no 
laboring on independent physical materials.143 Other problems may arise 
with Locke’s proviso concerning spoilage, as intellectual property and 
information are not subject to spoilage in the material sense. Although 
spoilage may occur if the creator fails to use all of the owned information 
in productive ways,144 only the complete non-usage of works would result 
in spoilage, which would be rare.145  
 Though this Lockean proviso may not exactly apply, concerns 
over the failure to properly use information are warranted. Some types of 
information (for example, trade secrets or personal data) may lose their 
usefulness and function if not used in the right time and exploited properly, 
a scenario that relates back to the tragedy of the commons arguments.146 
However, the “commons” analogy and its prescriptions may not be 
equipped to address these concerns, as it does with tangible property, for 
it is very difficult to define the commons abstractly in the case of 
information. We could borrow from intellectual property theory and 
consider the commons equivalent to the IP public domain. However, this 
approach would encounter similar difficulties that the public domain faces. 
The main objection is that the Lockean commons referred to appropriation 
                                                     
143 “The Lockean labor theory applies more easily because the common of ideas 
seems inexhaustible.” Hughes, supra note 142, at 51. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Shiffrin, supra note 142, at 140, 141, or GREGORY S. ALEXANDER 
& EDUARDO. M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 191, 192 
(2012).  
144 Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1182, 1183 (2003).   
145 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 58 (2011).  
146 The “tragedy of commons” is a well-known and widely built upon concept in 
the US, created by Garrett Hardin. A tragedy of the commons is a situation 
appearing when too many owners have a privilege to use a resource and no one 
has a right to exclude another. This leads to overuse and depletion of the resource. 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1248 (1968). 
Demsetz also discusses intellectual property. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory 
of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 359 (1967). See also F. Scott Kieff, 
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 697 (2001); Edmund Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable 
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 683–723 (1980); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 
325, 353 (1989). 
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in an earlier stage of societal development, and to tangible assets only, thus 
being inapplicable to the public domain and, consequently, to the case of 
information commons.147 
 Locke’s proviso concerning limitation on appropriation, however, 
may nevertheless apply.148 Although, theoretically, the “enough and as 
good” proviso is likely to be satisfied due to information not being scarce, 
thus rendering the proviso unnecessary, scarcity may still occur with 
negative consequences if appropriation prevents the dissemination of 
important information.149 For instance, some information could be 
necessary for self-preservation and subsistence, as required by Locke, 
making its appropriation harmful to the welfare of others. As a result, there 
would not be “enough and as good” left for others in the commons if the 
access were to be limited by property rights.150 This is especially true if 
propertization would, as suggested by many prominent commentators, 
jeopardize free speech, expression, sharing of knowledge and keeping 
archives and accurate history records.151 
 Generally, labor theory could be employed to justify property in 
certain kinds of information, where labor that could qualify as adequate 
for the purpose of labor theory (e.g., trade secrets) is present. However, 
general application to all kinds of information is unsuitable. Finally, the 
commons is even more problematic in the case of personal data, as such 
data is, by definition, tied to an individual and does not belong to everyone. 
Accordingly, labor theory is even less applicable to personal data. 
C. Utilitarian Theory 
 This section will first explain the utilitarian theories used to justify 
intellectual property and will then draw parallels with applying the theory 
to propertizing information. Inspired by Bentham, utilitarians and the 
neoclassical law and economics school argue that the main purpose of 
awarding intellectual property protection is incentivizing innovation.152 In 
                                                     
147 See Shiffrin, supra note 142, at 166–67, see also Merges, supra note 145, at 
35–39. 
148 C.B. McPherson, Editor’s Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT vii, xvii (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1980) (1690); 
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 56 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Pub. Co. 1980) (1690). 
149See Shiffrin, supra note 142.   
150 Jonathan Peterson, Lockean Property and Literary Works, 14 LEGAL THEORY 
257, 269 (2008). 
151 See Lemley, supra note 133, at 135; Pamela Samuelson, Should Economics 
Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy?, (2003-2004) 1 U. Ottawa. L & Tech. 
J. 3, 7 (2004); Litman, supra note 72; Shiffrin, supra note 142; LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006). 
152 See Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 326. 
No. 1]               DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW                    251 
order to achieve this, they argue that the law must recognize limited 
monopoly rights in creations and enable creators to recoup their 
investments.153 These assumptions underpinned legislation as early as the 
first modern copyright act, the Statute of Anne in 1709.154 Furthermore, 
the U.S. Constitution explicitly based its copyright and patent regimes on 
utilitarian foundations.155 
 Utilitarian theory often develops on the notion of free riding and 
the aforementioned tragedy of the commons.156 Free riding disables the 
creator from internalizing the full benefits of their creations, resulting in 
underinvestment.157 If intellectual property protection were not awarded, 
those who did not create could still enjoy the benefits. The creators, on the 
other hand, would be unable to recover the investments, efforts and costs 
they incur in the process of creating and innovating.158 Consequently, no 
creators would invest in creating.159 Thus, intellectual property protection 
eliminates this phenomenon, increasing the production of socially 
valuable intellectual property.160  
 How much intellectual property protection to afford, however, is 
up for debate. Landes and Posner recognize the central aim of copyright 
law as striking a balance between public and private interests.161 This 
balance is struck when net welfare is maximized, resulting in “the greatest 
good for the greatest number.”162 For example, in the context of copyright, 
this means that intellectual property rules should be geared to “maximize 
the benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from 
limiting access and the costs of administering copyright protection.”163 
Again, intellectual property achieves this by allowing the creator to 
internalizing positive externalities.164 But some scholars maintain that 
                                                     
153 Id. 
154 Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, 1710, (Gr. Brit.). 
155 U.S. Const. art I, § VIII, cl. 8. states that the purpose of protecting IP rights is 
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” As Samuelson observes: 
“[t]he principal justification for intellectual property law in the Anglo-American 
tradition is economic. Without a grant of exclusive rights, innovators would have 
too little incentive to invest in socially beneficial innovations . . . ” Samuelson, 
supra note 151. 
156 See supra note 146. 
157 See id. 
158 Id. at 353–54. 
159 For a commentary, see Lemley, supra note 133, at 12. 
160 Id. 
161 Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 326. 
162 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 12–13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789). 
163 Landes & Posner, supra note 146. 
164 This issues prevents the positive externalities to be enjoyed by the public. Id. 
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positive externalities are impossible to internalize, and that at any rate, 
consumption of creative outputs by many is desirable, as it enriches 
society and culture.165 Therefore, as the scholar Lemley states, “[I]f ‘free 
riding’ means merely obtaining a benefit from another’s investment, the 
law does not, cannot, and should not prohibit it.”166  
 Other opponents of using an exclusionary property right find that  
it is incomplete in striking an appropriate balance between private and 
public in the copyright context.167 The problem in these justifications for 
copyright, as scholars Boyle or Zemer would argue, is that they emphasize 
the property component as a precondition for incentivizing creation, thus 
disregarding the role of the public domain168 or the self-interested 
motivation for creation without legal incentives. 169 
 In addition, critics deny that intellectual property protection is 
always necessary to recover the cost of innovation.170 This claim mainly 
relates to patents, as they are understood to require the highest level of 
investment in relation to other intellectual property rights.171 To support 
this argument, critics present the examples of innovations that are actually 
hard to copy or reverse engineer, such as integrated circuits and hardware 
protected by obfuscation techniques. In addition, some innovators recoup 
profits by keeping them secret. Other inventors may distribute products in 
a way that is expensive to replicate, as is the case in motion pictures on 
film stock or encrypting data. Finally, in a constant circle of innovation, 
there is a phenomenon where first movers are able to recoup costs, as 
happens in news, fashion, and trade secrets.172   
 Although utilitarian arguments could be used to justify 
propertization of information like trade secrets, they are weak 
                                                     
165 Id. at 56 
166 Id. at 24; see ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 143, at 184. 
167 See Lior Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, 1 I.P.Q. 55, 55–71 (2006); 
Lemley, supra note 133, at 1066–67.   
168 See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 244 (1996). 
169 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Incentives Argument for Intellectual 
Property Protection, 4 J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 49, 50 (2009) (observing that there 
is no solid evidence and research in the direction that granting IP for a certain 
period of time is “in fact necessary to incent creative production” and people do 
create even without these incentives). 
170 See id. at 51, 57. 
171 See Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 350. 
172 See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 143, at 188; Wesley M. Cohen, 
Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 
13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).  
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justifications for the propertization of information on the whole. This 
approach especially fails with online and digital information, where 
incentives are not needed where information overload exists.173 This 
approach ultimately fails, however, because internalizing positive 
externalities to a great extent should be avoided.  
D. Personhood Theories 
 Personhood theories for intellectual property represent a strong 
alternative to the previous theories. They emphasize a personal, non-
pecuniary version of intellectual property, concluding that intellectual 
creation is an expression of one’s self.174 Discussing whether ideas and 
creations can be considered things and property, the philosopher Hegel 
notes they can be contracted, but they are something inward and mental. 
Thus, Hegel implies it is hard to describe ideas in legal terms.175 Although 
primarily mental, Hegel concludes that “by expressing them it may 
embody them and in this way they are put in the category of ‘things.’”176 
Hughes in particular finds this theory appealing, noting that “the Hegelian 
personality theory applies more easily because intellectual products, even 
the most technical, seem to result from the individual's mental 
processes.”177  
 One of the most prominent personhood theories based on Hegelian 
arguments has been put forth by Radin. This theory divides property into 
fungible and personal categories and asserts that “the more closely 
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”178 This provides 
powerful grounds for strong intellectual property protection. The problem 
here, however, relates to alienability of creative works. Whether an author 
can restrict further communication of her work must be determined, as 
does the issue over whether it remains within her “personhood.”179 Indeed, 
authors may have a strong interest in the continuing control over their 
                                                     
173 See, e.g., Martin J. Eppler & Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of Information 
Overload: A Review of Literature from Organization Science, Accounting, 
Marketing, MIS, and Related Disciplines, 20 THE INFO. SOC’Y 325, 325–44 
(2004); Troy A. Peredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 417–86 (2003). 
174 See Hughes, supra note 142, at 330 (“[A]n idea belongs to its creator because 
the idea is a manifestation of the creator’s personality or self.”). 
175 See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶ 
38 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967). 
176 Id. 
177 Hughes, supra note 142, at 365. 
178 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 986 
(1982). 
179 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 190 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2007). 
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expression,180 but the expression itself may in fact “[c]ommodify what was 
declared uncommodifiable.”181 This question of alienability must be 
answered before the proper intellectual property protections are 
determined, for Hegel says nothing about whether intellectual property 
should be protected. Hegel simply claims that, if society adopts such a 
regime based in personhood, it is coherent to formulate it in terms of true 
property rather than some sui generis rights.182  
 Personhood theory is applicable to information to an extent. 
However, because of their non-personal, commercial character, some 
kinds of information (such as trade secrets and fresh news) cannot be 
justified under this theory. In contrast, other information (such as personal 
data that is intrinsically tied to an individual) can perhaps find better 
support under this approach.  
 After evaluating these three theories of property and their 
connection to email-information, none of them are sufficient. Thus, the 
non-copyrightable content of emails, information, and personal data is not 
and should not be considered property.  
CONCLUSION 
 Based upon current copyright and property law, and upon the 
western theories of property, the legal nature of email appears clear. Email 
content is not the property of its users. It can, however, be protected by 
copyright, the tort of misuse of confidential information, trade secret 
doctrine, data protection, or publicity rights.   
 Thus, there is a conflict between the law and the market, in the 
form of service providers in their respective treatment of email. Laws give 
rights to users with respect to their email content only insofar as it falls 
under the aforementioned protections. This falls short of full ownership 
protection, exposing a potentially large and indeterminable proportion of 
email content. In contrast, the market and other actors support a different 
conclusion: that users own their own content just as they own tangible 
property.183 Ideally, legal harmonization should first occur between U.S. 
                                                     
180 Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of 
Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 400 (1993). 
181 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1149, 1222 n.310 (1998). 
182 See id. at 189. 
183 However, the account itself is not the property of the individual. The owner 
has a contractual right to use it but does not have a right to transfer it and the 
account remains the property of the service provider. See Google Terms of 
Service, GOOGLE (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.google.com/intl/en-
GB/policies/terms/ (“Using our Services does not give you ownership of any 
intellectual property rights in our Services or the content that you access. You 
No. 1]               DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW                    255 
and U.K. legal regimes to rectify the slight differences in approach to the 
legal nature of email content. Harmonization should then occur between 
the legal and market systems, for it would clarify the legal consensus and 
enable more coherent market approaches to technology. More specific 
suggestion in this regard, as well as the relationship between legal nature 
of emails and their transmission upon death, will be explored in the 
author’s future publications. 
                                                     
may not use content from our Services unless you obtain permission from its 
owner or are otherwise permitted by law. These terms do not grant you the right 
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